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Preface 
Painting thinks. This claim complicates the respective discourses of art history and philosophy 
from which this project draws and within which it can be located. Art history and its 
periodizations (biographical or epochal) as well as philosophy and its concepts prove insufficient 
to grasp the life of painting that is its thought, and instead prefer to mortify works so that they 
may be contextualized historically or fixed in a conceptual schema. In each case, a formalism of 
ideas displaces an empirical engagement with concrete works, such that painting becomes an 
inert medium for passive reflection and a vehicle for the concept elaborated outside its domain. 
What must be avoided in the approach to painting is a historical narrativization that obfuscates 
the singularity of individual works and a theoretical undertaking that incorporates art as a mere 
illustration of a pre-formulated system. The origins of this project lie in a confrontation with the 
problem of formalism in art history and the philosophy of art, and it uses the means of each to 
think with painting. It attempts not to “solve” this problem theoretically, but rather to put into 
practice a certain way doing art history and philosophy of art that I want to indicate in this 
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preface, so that the use of the “flatbed” is clarified and the project’s somewhat unconventional 
construction explained. 
 The concept of the “flatbed picture plane,” taken from art historian Leo Steinberg, serves 
two roles in this project. First, it acts as a strategic way into the problems raised by Clement 
Greenberg and his formalist evaluation of Modernism. With the flatbed we propose a clinical 
survey or diagnosis of the forces of Modernist painting that underlie Greenberg’s analysis, but 
which are ultimately suppressed in order to bolster the claim to the overarching—that is, 
formal—model of “pictorial flatness.” Second, the flatbed introduces the problem of the 
silkscreen and of a painting that is no longer defined by Modernist categories. In both instances, 
our use of the concept is not an end in itself; the point is not to simply define what the flatbed 
means or to show how concrete works embody or demonstrate it. Critically, the flatbed is useful 
insofar as it allows us to think the shortcomings of the formalist conception of Modernist 
painting and the emergence of another type of painting that follows after it. Clinically, the 
flatbed becomes a productive generator of other concepts that reconceive the Modernist picture 
with “other criteria” and demarcate a new situation initiated by the screen.  
 In constructing the critique and reconfiguration of Greenberg’s Modernism as well as in 
the examination of the silkscreen, we have tried to remain attentive to the analysis of concrete 
works. Subsequently, arguments and concepts are introduced in the middle—en milieu—in a 
close, empirical engagement with paintings in order to stay as intimate as possible with the 
works, even while attempting to draw out implications that exceed them. In this way, we aim to 
avoid the traps of formalism and nominalism in order to enact a properly transcendental 
empiricist approach to painting at this intersection of art history and the philosophy of art. 
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The first, brief section details the concept of the “flatbed picture plane” as Steinberg 
elaborates it in his essay “Other Criteria.” The second section on Modernism expands 
Steinberg’s engagement with Clement Greenberg and supplement’s the latter’s notion of 
“pictorial flatness” (an optical category) with an understanding of the tactility of the Modernist 
canvas and the importance of the hand. The final section shifts from the tactile Modernist picture 
to the smooth surface of the silkscreen and looks beyond the flatbed to address a universe of 
screens and the emerging paradigm of the digital.  
 
The Flatbed 
In 1968, the American art critic Leo Steinberg proposed the concept of the “flatbed picture 
plane” to account for the transformation of painting in what he termed the “event of the 1950s.”1 
Against the “formalist” line of criticism initiated by Clement Greenberg, Steinberg deployed the 
flatbed to elaborate an “other criteria” of painting that did not rest on the overarching model of 
“pictorial flatness” guaranteeing painting’s specificity as a medium and its Modernist status. 
According to Greenberg, the deployment of visual flatness by the Modernist painter counteracted 
the “illusionistic” tendency of Classical painting to “disguise” the formal flatness of the picture 
plane in order to generate space in depth. In opposition to this “illusionism” of the Classical, the 
Modernist picture moved toward formal self-consciousness with the production of the flat plane. 
By contrast, for Steinberg, Greenberg’s formalism failed on two fronts: it could not account for 
the emergence of new artists and styles succeeding abstract expressionism (Robert 
Rauschenberg, Pop), and its own criteria of “pictorial flatness” was insufficient to make sense of 
the break between the Classical Masters and the Modernist painter.  																																																								1	Leo	Steinberg,	Other	Criteria:	Confrontations	with	Twentieth-Century	Art	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1972),	85.	
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Whereas Greenberg heralded a break from the “Old Masters” beginning with the 
movement toward flatness in Manet, Steinberg—a scholar of Renaissance art—held that 
Modernist painters maintained an essential tie with Classical representation: Manet through the 
American Action Painters retained the conception of the picture as the presentation of a 
“worldspace” synchronized with erect human posture, “The top of the picture corresponds to 
where we hold our heads aloft; while its lower edge gravitates to where we place our feet.”2 Not 
even the European avant-garde and its quest to deconstruct Albertian perspective escapes this 
prognosis: “Even in Picasso’s Cubist collages, where the Renaissance worldspace concept almost 
breaks down, there is still a harking back to implied acts of vision, to something that was once 
actually seen.”3 Thus, the Classical affirmation of verticality goes unchallenged even in the 
radical flatness of the Abstract Expressionists—the carriers of the Modernist tradition for 
Greenberg. Toward this end, Steinberg goes as far as to say that “the Abstract Expressionists 
were still nature painters.”4 
 With reference to the techniques of the printing press, Steinberg developed the flatbed 
picture plane to describe a transformation in the orientation of painting. The flatbed 
accomplishes two things: first, it shifts from Classical verticality to a principle of horizontality 
that is no longer tied to human perception and erect posture; second, it shifts the status of the 
painted surface from that of a window or mirror (a presentation of a worldspace) to that of a 
“receptor surface.”5 The former is a shift in the “subject matter of art,” a shift from nature to 
culture, the latter a shift from the canvas conceived as the equivalent of the experience of the 
natural world to that of a “matrix of information” or screen upon which “data” can be collected 																																																								2	Ibid.,	82.	3	Ibid.	4	Ibid.,	84.	5	Ibid.	
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or scattered.6 In Steinberg’s own words, “The pictures of the last fifteen to twenty years [i.e. the 
1950s and 60s] insist on a radically new orientation, in which the painted surface is no longer the 
analogue of a visual experience of nature but of operational processes.”7 The flatbed picture, 
acting as a screen, disqualifies itself as a worldspace—distinct from the (humanist) 
representational paradigm initiated by the Renaissance—to become an “image of an image,”8 in 
which “the picture ends up as a verification of its own opaque surface.”9 The painted surface, 
then, is submitted to immanent operational processes that no longer extend beyond the frame 
toward the organic world.  
Some aspects of this transformation were anticipated by previous painting, which is why 
Steinberg offers the flatbed not only as the successor of Greenberg’s Modernism, but also as a 
concept that demands the latter’s reevaluation. The following section details this engagement 
with Modernism and thereby positions the flatbed as a supplement to Greenberg’s variant of 
Modernist painting. This account will be necessary to raise the issue of a beyond of Modernist 
painting with the silkscreen in the final section. 
 
Greenberg Revisited – Modernism and the Flatbed 
Steinberg raises two principal objections to the Greenberg’s Modernism. First, pictorial flatness 
fails to account for the novelty of Modernist painting because the differences between the latter 
and Classical painting are more than optical; neither is flatness sufficient to account for the new 
painting because it is just as “flat” as previous painting, but it introduces new criteria relating to 
the orientation of the picture plane itself. Second, the specificity of painting as a medium, its 																																																								6	Ibid.,	84-5.	7	Ibid.,	84.	8	Ibid.,	91.	9	Ibid.,	85.	
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uniqueness from other arts (sculpture, theater, literature—color, depth and narrative), cannot be 
maintained as the formal precondition of the evaluation of painting as such. Such a precondition 
closes off painting from not only its perpetual interaction with other arts but, also, from “non-art” 
techniques and materials such as the technology of printing and mechanical reproduction (hence 
Steinberg’s insistence on the printing press as a model for the flatbed). In fact, these two 
objections can be collapsed into one, since pictorial flatness is, for Greenberg, the vehicle of 
Modernist painting’s self-criticism and purification—that is, the means by which painting asserts 
its specificity as a medium and its autonomy as an art unto itself. In Greenberg’s own words: 
“Because flatness was the only condition shared with no other art, Modernist painting oriented 
itself to flatness as it did to nothing else.”10 It will be productive to reconstruct Greenberg’s 
argument. 
Greenberg elaborates the Modernist movement toward flatness and “purity” in opposition 
to the “illusionism” of the Classical Masters. This is in keeping with his definition of 
Modernism11 and its method of “self-criticism” and continual “self-definition”: 
The task of self-criticism became [with Modernism] to eliminate from the specific effects 
of each art any and every effect that might conceivably be borrowed from or by the 
medium of any other art. Thus would each art be rendered “pure,” and in its “purity” find 
the guarantee of its standards of quality as well as of its independence. “Purity” meant 
self-definition, and the enterprise of self-criticism in the arts became one of self-
definition with a vengeance.12  
 
According to Greenberg, the Modernists move from the “illusion” of Classical space with its 
emphasis on the figurative picture to that of the “illusion” of “pure” art guaranteed by pictorial 
																																																								10	Clement	Greenberg,	Clement	Greenberg:	The	Collected	Essays	and	Criticism,	Volume	4	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1993),	87.	11	Greenberg	from	“Modernist	Painting”:	“The	essence	of	Modernism	lies,	as	I	see	it,	in	the	use	of	characteristic	methods	of	a	discipline	to	criticize	the	discipline	itself,	not	in	order	to	subvert	it	but	in	order	to	entrench	it	more	firmly	in	its	area	of	competence”	(85).	12	Ibid.,	86.	
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flatness and the practice of its internal self-definition.13 The distinction between “illusion” and 
flatness in Classical and Modern painting is therefore relative. The difference is one of emphasis. 
In a Classical painting, the fact of the flatness is, pace Greenberg, subordinated to that of the 
figurative picture—the flatness of the surface serves the “illusion” of the picture rather than 
calling attention to itself. Thus, Classical painting subordinates the characteristics of the medium 
to the figurative plane by concealing its material properties or indicating them indirectly: “The 
limitations that constitute the medium of painting—the flat surface, the shape of the support, the 
properties of the pigment—were treated by the Old Masters as negative factors that could be 
acknowledged only implicitly or indirectly.”14 With the Modernists this tendency is reversed and 
the “negative factors” of the medium become “positive”: now, pictures assert themselves as 
pictures first; the disclosure of the content of the picture follows after. In Greenberg’s words: 
“One is made aware of the flatness of their pictures before, instead of after, being made aware of 
what the flatness contains. Whereas one tends to see what is in an Old Master before one sees the 
picture itself, one sees a Modernist picture as a picture itself.”15 
Accordingly, Manet is taken as the first Modernist painter because his pictures primarily 
direct focus onto the flatness of the surface before registering the figurative plane of pictorial 
depth, i.e., what is in the picture. Manet accomplishes this shift by adopting a new “syncopated 
kind of shading-modeling,” the precedent of which is to be found in photography and its 
preference for lighting the picture from the front.16 The result of this “front-lighting” in Manet is 
a method of “compact” shading that compresses the visible space and surges its objects and the 
background itself toward the surface of the painting, which has the effect of deemphasizing the 																																																								13	Ibid.,	94.	14	Ibid.,	86.	15	Ibid.,	87.	16	Ibid.,	242.	
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“intermediate gradations of light-and-dark” that had characterized the sculpturally oriented 
composition of the Classical tradition.17 When the picture is illuminated from the front, reducing 
the play of light and shadow in the foreground, “the local colors that the greys or browns shade 
come through more purely—which means more flatly.”18 The shading of Le Déjeuner sur 
l’herbe (1863), enhanced by the picture’s almost total illumination of the foreground from a 
different light source than that of the patch of sky in the background, transforms the foreground 
of the painting into the production of a flat plane without shadow, which serves the radiance of 
color more than the delimitation of three-dimensional forms. This conflict between the two 
systems of light literally splits the canvas horizontally into its upper and lower half, indicated by 
the outstretched hand of the male figure on the right of the canvas. 
 
Édouard Manet, Le Déjeuner sur l’herbe, 1863. 
Likewise in The Fifer (1866), where the photographically inspired composition of Manet 
is at its most tangible, the figure lacks both placement in depth due to the voidance of 
background and the absence of elaborate modeling due to the presence of exterior front-lighting. 
Only a minimal shadow outlined at the base of the figure’s two feet gives the impression of his 																																																								17	Ibid.	18	Ibid.	
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presence in space beyond two dimensions. The fifer appears to float across the canvas and hover 
on its surface, becoming an arrangement of colors on a flat plane.19 In this, the “illusion” of 
depth gives way to the formal fact of “pictorial flatness,” as Classical composition gives way to 
the “self-conscious” construction of the Modernist picture.  
 
Édouard Manet, The Fifer, 1866. 
Such an analysis opens Greenberg up to the criticism that his account of Modernist 
painting is formulated at the expense of the content of painting and, thereby, ignores the ways in 
which Classical art called attention to itself as art even prior to Modernist flatness. This criticism, 
voiced by Steinberg himself, aims at the disqualification of Greenberg’s entire schema: 
“Greenberg’s theoretical schema keeps breaking down because it insists on defining modern art 
without acknowledgment of its content, and historical art without recognizing its formal self-																																																								19	One	is	reminded	of	Courbet’s	conjecture	that	Olympia	looked	like	a	playing	card	(Greenberg,	242).	Additionally,	other	Manet	paintings	suggest	a	floating	figure	that	appears	to	hover	on	the	canvas—for	instance,	Le	Balcon	and	Luncheon	in	the	Studio.		
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consciousness.”20 Steinberg offers the examples of Dutch interior painting and Velázquez as a 
counter-measure to Greenberg’s failure to consider the specificity of Classical painting.  
 
Diego Velázquez, Las Meninas, 1656. 																																																								20	Leo	Steinberg,	Other	Criteria:	Confrontations	with	Twentieth-Century	Art	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1972),	71.	
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These examples demonstrate the capacity of the Classical to reflect upon its own condition of 
flatness and artifice through the content of the paintings themselves: “The ‘recall to art’ may be 
engineered by the subject matter itself.”21 In particular, Velázquez’s famous interior, Las 
Meninas (1656), demonstrates the reflexivity of Classical painting, a self-reflexivity that is 
internal to its content and revealed through the elaborate depiction and multiplication of (flat) 
imaging surfaces. In the painting, the intricate play of surfaces generated by the inclusion of 
various frames—like the infamous mirror reflecting the royal couple, the open doorway, and the 
framed paintings adorning the walls—“soliloquize[s] about the capacities of the surface and the 
nature of illusion itself.”22  
Thus, the Old Masters do not merely disguise the formal flatness of the picture plane in 
order to prop up the “illusory” space of the content of the picture; rather, a consideration of form 
is elicited by means of the content and the subject matter of the painting. In this way, the Old 
Masters “maintain an explicit, controlled, ever-visible dualism.”23 Steinberg concludes: 
“Whatever else it may be about, all art is about art. All original art searches its limits, and the 
difference between the old and the modernist is not in the fact of self-definition but in the 
direction which this self-definition takes. This direction being part of the content.”24 Still, 
Steinberg’s perspective is not wholly incompatible with Greenberg’s. The harshness of 
Steinberg’s criticism on this point results from the fact that he takes Greenberg’s criteria to be 
merely “subjective,” i.e., having to do only with how a viewer confronts a canvas, whether she 																																																								21	Ibid.,	72.	22	Ibid.,	74.	23	Ibid.	Steinberg	continues:	“Good	illusionist	painting	not	only	anchors	depth	to	the	plane;	it	is	almost	never	without	built-in	devices	designated	to	suspend	the	illusion,	and	the	potency	of	these	devices	depends—like	the	appreciation	of	counterpoint	or	of	puns—on	the	spectator’s	ability	to	register	two	things	in	concert,	to	receive	both	the	illusion	and	the	means	of	illusion	at	once”	(74).	24	Ibid.,	76.	
		
13	
sees the “illusion” or is made aware of its flatness first—although support for the latter can be 
found in Greenberg himself: “One [the viewer] is made aware of the flatness of their [i.e. 
Modern] pictures before, instead of after, being made aware of what the flatness contains” 
(Greenberg, 87). This would seem to suggest, as Steinberg accuses, that the difference between 
Classical and Modern painting lies in how one looks at the pictures. To paraphrase Steinberg: if, 
for instance, one sees the flatness of a Poussin before taking in the figurative content, does this 
mean that Poussin is Modern (Steinberg, 69)?  
However, Greenberg does not say that Classical art lacks formal self-consciousness as 
such; but rather that its self-consciousness is registered by and deployed through subject matter, 
or within and through the “illusion” of space in depth. Hence Greenberg’s insistence on the 
“apparent contradiction” of Classical painting:  
The Old Masters had sensed that it was necessary to preserve what is called the integrity 
of the picture plane: that is, to signify the enduring presence of flatness underneath and 
above the most vivid illusion of three-dimensional space. The apparent contradiction 
involved was essential to the success of their art, as it is indeed to the success of all 
pictorial art.25 
 
In other words, the very effectiveness of Classical painting lies in its capacity not to eradicate or 
repress the two-dimensional precondition underlying the construction of three-dimensional space 
but, instead, to productively relate the latter against the flatness of the surface, in this way 
signifying it.26 As in Las Meninas, once again, the reflexivity of Classical painting is 
demonstrated in the play of gazes and surfaces that Velázquez enacts within the drama of 
Classical representation. 																																																								25	Clement	Greenberg,	Clement	Greenberg:	The	Collected	Essays	and	Criticism,	Volume	4	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1993),	87.	26	Perhaps	the	clearest	enactment	of	this	tension	can	be	found	in	Hans	Holbein	the	Younger’s	The	Ambassadors,	in	which	the	flatness	of	the	plane	underlying	the	modeling	of	its	figures	and	objects	is	signified	by	the	presence	of	the	anamorphic	skull	in	the	painting’s	foreground.	
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In this way, the self-consciousness of Classical painting is communicated precisely 
through the deployment of “illusory” spatial depth in its perpetual exchange with pictorial 
flatness, as Steinberg’s own example of Velázquez demonstrates. This establishes a kind of 
closed circuit of “illusory” content and what one could call “formal” flatness, although the fact 
of the circuit makes this distinction itself redundant. On one level, the circuit of Las Meninas 
exchanges the reflexive play of flat surfaces in the picture with the formal flatness of the picture 
plane, on which content propels itself into a consideration of the formal dimension of the 
painting—even “painting” as such—just as the formal characteristics of the medium are 
integrated on the level of content. Because Classical painting does not admit the extraction of 
formal traits from the aesthetic plane of content, flatness is not formal in Classical painting; this 
is the shift inaugurated by the Modernists. Modernism, therefore, cannot be conceived as a 
“progression” from the Classical, transforming its “illusions” into critical self-consciousness; it 
implements another plane, which Greenberg designates with the label “pictorial flatness.”27 The 
new plane of the Modern cannot strictly be set in opposition to the Classical plane—here 
Greenberg is perhaps too quick to subsume the two under one overarching category, “pictorial 
art.” This is not to say that the two are isolated or closed, but that each generates its own 
“criteria,” which is not to be opposed to or dissociated from specific works as general categories, 
but which, nonetheless, can be mapped or laid out.28 Neither does this imply that Classical 
																																																								27	The	efficacy	of	this	label	will	be	addressed	in	the	following.	28	This	is	the	real	merit	of	Steinberg’s	essay,	“Other	Criteria”:	Steinberg	does	not	simply	dismiss	formalism	in	the	name	of,	for	instance,	a	return	to	the	specificity	of	works	extracted	from	all	formal	considerations;	rather	through	the	deployment	of	the	“flatbed”	he	introduces	“other	criteria”	intended	to	place	transcendental	conditions	into	relation	with	concrete	works,	such	that	neither	the	formal	considerations	nor	the	specificity	of	the	work	itself	can	be	detached	from	one	another.	The	concept	of	the	“flatbed”	allows	Steinberg	to	place	the	two	in	a	productive	dynamism—an	approach	that	shields	him	from	empty	formalism	and	from	art	historical	analysis.	
		
15	
painting fails to register a self-consciousness of medium in the picture; rather it does this by non-
Modernist means within the closed circuit of the Classical problematic. 
At first glance, it appears as though Steinberg’s criticism of Greenberg on this point is the 
usual one: that it is reductionist (and wrong) to consider Renaissance art as “illusionistic” in 
contrast to self-aware Modernist painting which dispenses with “illusion” in order to attain the 
self-consciousness of “pure” art. But, on closer inspection, Steinberg means something else 
entirely—something more precise. As he explains: 
Greenberg is fully conscious of the airy illusionism observed by [Donald] Judd in 
Modernist painting. But though open atmospheric effects, such as are found in Rothko or 
Jules Olitski, clearly deny and dissemble the picture’s material surface, he nevertheless 
finds them congruent with [Modernist] Painting’s self-definition because the illusion 
conveyed is visual, rather than tactile or kinesthetic.29 
 
Steinberg’s criticism of pictorial flatness drives at both its reliance upon the figure of “illusion” 
in Classical art, precarious at best, and, more pertinently, that it casts to the side the consideration 
of materials in Modernist painting. The category of pictorial flatness turns the materiality of 
brushstrokes, the facticity of paint (its density and weight or “throwness” in Action Painting), 
and the texture(s) of the canvas into secondary characteristics of the drive toward flatness. In 
other words, what Greenberg suppresses in order to posit Modernist painting as a purely optical 
experience is the primacy of materials and their tactile traits.30  
Toward this end, Modernist painting is defined not so much by the formal properties of 
pictorial flatness as it is by the propensity for tactility in its handling of the picture surface: the 																																																								29	Leo	Steinberg,	Other	Criteria:	Confrontations	with	Twentieth-Century	Art	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1972),	70.	30	Likewise, Hubert Damisch draws attention to the transformation of the “thickness” of the 
plane, in which the loss of perspectival background in Modernist painting is precipitated by the 
raising to the surface of the “underneath” of the painting—its texture and materials. See Hubert	Damisch,	Le	fenêtre	jaune	cadmium;	ou	Les	dessous	de	la	peinture	(Paris:	Seuil,	1984).	See	also:	Gilles	Deleuze	and	Félix	Guattari,	What	Is	Philosophy?	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1994),	193-6.	
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perspective and simulated depth of the Classical plane are decomposed into an expressivity of 
material in the Modernist plane as the volume or thickness of the flat surface. Still, the tactility 
proper to Modernist painting differs from the kind Greenberg attributes to the Old Masters: the 
former is not an imaginative tactility stemming from the viewer’s sensation of the figurative or 
perspectival illusion of depth (i.e., what Greenberg credits to sculpture), but rather generates 
sensation from the tactility of the material itself. Modernist painting is, therefore, not flat but 
thick or becoming thick: the material passes into sensation and matter becomes expressive; it is 
no longer optic but tactile; and the plane is no longer organized from the exterior by the eye of 
the painter, but expressed with the manual power of the hand liberated from its subordination to 
the sovereign gaze. 
Action Painting and Abstract Expressionism are the foremost examples of this expressive 
plane, although it applies just as much to Greenberg’s location of the first Modernists, Manet and 
the Impressionists. From Olympia (1863) Manet’s undertaking was to disassemble the spectacle 
of Classical painting by which the viewer and the painter himself occupy a fixed position in 
relation to the picture in order to constitute the scene laid out for the gaze. One of the factors 
contributing to this effect, already mentioned above, is the shift from “natural” lighting, by 
which the picture is lit from “within” (even when the source is not actually present in the visible 
field, as in Las Meninas), producing a three-dimensional effect as light surrounds objects in the 
field creating shadows in a spectacle of light and dark; to that of exterior front-lighting in which 
the plane is overcharged with a force of illumination that diminishes the darkness of the visible 
space with its objects and figures, if not eliminating it entirely. This has the effect of projecting 
the plane forward into this new system of visibility as it dispenses with the illusion of 
perspectival space and the “ ‘spiritual’ animation of a background” in favor of  “the silent 
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autonomy of the foreground.”31 In other words, as Greenberg maintains, the plane becomes flat. 
In the words of Éric Alliez, Manet’s “flat architecture” transforms the plane into a “simplified 
play of surfaces and colors” that divests itself from the drama of Classical representation and its 
theatrical illumination.32  
 
Édouard Manet, Olympia, 1863. 
Such a divestment is forcefully enacted in Olympia where the “vulgar” flatness of the 
picture is coupled with the almost total absence of theatrical space in which the viewer-spectator 
could work out the scene. Following Foucault, the “scandal” following the painting’s exhibition 
at the 1865 Salon was not caused by the picture’s “subject matter,” but the lighting and its 
																																																								31	Éric	Alliez,	The	Brain-Eye:	New	Histories	of	Modern	Painting	(London:	Rowman	&	Littlefield,	2016),	131.	32	Ibid.	
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flattening of Classical space.33 Setting Manet’s picture in contrast to Titian’s Venus of Urbino 
(1538)—a now conventional comparison34—demonstrates the radicalism of the lighting, which 
outweighs the “frankness” of the nude.  
 
Titian, Venus of Urbino, 1538. 
The first obvious difference is that Manet elects to place everything in the foreground and 
remove spatial depth from the background. In Titian’s Venus, on the contrary, the contrast 
between foreground and background is vertically separated in the middle of the painting by a 
wall over which a drapery is hung that pushes the scene in depth onto the right side of the 																																																								33	See	Michel	Foucault,	Manet	and	the	Object	of	Painting	(London:	Tate,	2010),	63-6.	34	A	comparison	made	by	Georges	Bataille	in	his	critical	study	of	Manet.	For	Bataille,	Manet	performs	a	secularization	of	the	Classical	form	by	transposing	the	mythological	theme	of	Titian’s	Venus	into	“the	world	of	his	[Manet’s]	day”:	“[Manet]	brought	the	goddess	down	to	earth	and	inflicted	human	standards	on	her”	(Georges	Bataille,	Manet:	Biographical	and	
Critical	Study	(New	York:	Skira	Inc.,	1955),	68-9).	
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picture, while the left is reserved for the figure in the foreground. Set in tension with the 
foreground of the left side, adjacent to the reclining figure, the right side of Venus opens onto an 
interior scene occupied by a standing woman and a kneeling child who bows in the direction of a 
window that opens the interior up to the outside, the sky and its illumination by the sun. In 
Olympia, Manet extends the wall of Titian’s picture across the right side of the canvas, blocking 
the scene in depth by eliminating the background and eradicating the possibility of “natural” 
illumination—the Classical system of light. Moreover, Manet propels the figure(s) in the 
background of Venus forward into the front of the picture, pushing the figure with the flowers to 
the edge of the bed, so that she hangs over it, as if intruding upon the once pure and distinct 
space of the foreground occupied by the solitary nude. Likewise, it is as if the viewer herself 
intrudes upon the foreground, surprising the figure who sits slightly erect—more upright than 
Titian’s Venus—which is further signaled by Manet’s “substitution” of Titian’s sleeping dog at 
the far corner of the bed for a fully vertical cat, as if the viewer had startled it from its dormancy.  
In this way Olympia “stages” the interruption of Classical spectacle. The scene is no 
longer illuminated independently of the viewer that looks on it. In Manet, the viewer is 
implicated in a new system of visibility where light issues from the front, off the canvas, exactly 
from the place where the viewer is situated. The Classical triple relation of scene-light-viewer 
(spectator) is collapsed into a dual relation whereby the source of illumination is inseparable 
from the position that the viewer assumes when looking at the picture and that the painter 
assumes when manipulating the artifice of the scene with his materials on the surface of the flat 
plane. As Foucault writes: 
That is to say, there are not three elements—nudity, lighting and we who surprise the 
game of nudity and lighting, there is [rather] nudity and us, we who are in the very place 
of lighting; in other words, it is our gaze which, in opening itself upon the nudity of 
Olympia, illuminates her. It is we who render it visible; our gaze upon the Olympia is a 
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lantern, it is that which carries the light; we are responsible for the visibility and for the 
nudity of Olympia.35 
 
The third dimension that lights the scene for the viewer’s gaze is effaced in favor of front 
lighting that coincides with the look of the viewer and the activity of the painter, a shift from 
“natural” perspective and illumination to that of the artifice of painting, a manipulation of light 
and color on a flat surface. The “solar world” of the Classical is eclipsed by the two dimensions 
of the flat plane, which are not given but constructed out of materials that the painter fabricates 
with his hands. The painted surface is no longer the recipient of form from the exterior; it 
becomes an animated space where the expressivity of materials are gathered and dispersed. The 
painter ceases to be the executor of pre-composed optical schema brought to the canvas from the 
outside; to the contrary, he takes his place in the picture not as an “innocent eye” but as an 
artificer through the laying out of a flat plane where he works with his materials directly on the 
surface.36 
With this attention paid to the construction of the two-dimensional plane and its 
affirmation of painting’s artifice, Manet’s picture “exhibit[s] its operational dimensions” in the 
constitution of a “space that exists only in relation to its own limits.” The painting becomes: 																																																								35	Michel	Foucault,	Manet	and	the	Object	of	Painting	(London:	Tate,	2010),	66.	Similarly,	Bataille	writes	of	Olympia:	“[…]	the	picture	obliterates	the	text,	and	the	meaning	of	the	
picture	is	not	in	the	text	behind	it	but	in	the	obliteration	of	that	text.	[…]	In	her	provocative	literalness	she	is	nothing.	Her	real	nudity	(not	merely	that	of	her	body)	is	the	silence	that	emanates	from	her,	like	that	from	a	sunken	ship.	[…]	What	shocked	was	the	ruthlessness	with	which	Manet	wiped	the	slate	clean,	and	also	the	starkness—which	charms	us	today—of	an	art	converted	into	the	supreme	value	(or	the	supreme	charm)	and	not	into	the	majesty	of	conventional	sentiments,	which	once	made	the	grandeur	of	reigning	princes”	(Bataille,	67).		36	One	can	understand	why	Foucault	places	Velázquez’s	Las	Meninas	at	the	turning	point	of	the	Classical	and	the	Modern,	since	the	painter	literally	places	himself	in	the	picture	as	a	meta-representation	of	Classical	representation.	Yet,	in	Las	Meninas	this	self-reflexive	act	is	still	entirely	in	the	service	of	Classical	staging;	its	materials	are	not	set	against	the	composition	of	forms;	rather	its	forms	start	to	think—“I	paint	therefore	I	am”	(reference	taken	from	Jacques	Lacan,	Seminar	13,	Lesson	of	May	11,	1966).	
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an image prepared on a plane whose two dimensions do not refer back to a world that is 
given, ordered by the third dimension, and to consciousness as the centre of perspective, 
to the metaphysical point, or to the world perceived by an innocent eye—but to a new 
science of the cutting of the picture.37 
 
This “new science” operates manually, that is, by cutting the frame with one’s hands, rather than 
with one’s eye. The hands frame the picture and set the materials of painting against the 
imposition of Classical forms, liberating the “matter” of painting from its assumption of 
Classical figuration. By placing the picture in relation to its own material construction, 
Manet’s painting […] declares itself as a return to matter, to the materials of painting 
placed in the service of the construction of a plane without which there could be no 
presentation, within the picture itself, of the material properties of the canvas and the 
operations of the painter.38 
 
The picture, in this way, does not present a visible scene for the eye or imitate a world outside 
the painting; rather, with Manet, painting participates in the visible as an event or an accident, 
divorced from the intention of forms. Painting becomes principally artifice as the visible 
becomes autonomous, unlinked from a transcendent Idea or a consciousness that would stabilize 
it, just as the forces of construction are released from the material(s) of the art as the hand is 
liberated from the eye. Here, as Foucault implies, the Classical system of light is invested with a 
power of invisibility that pervades the Modernist picture, in which what is seen becomes a vector 
to the outside of the visible, to a beyond of representation and its play of forms, where insensible 
forces can be indicated or felt within its two dimensions. The Modernist painting breaks open the 
Classical circuit of light and staging, as invisible forces are summoned materially on the plane 
through the deployment a visible field deprived of spectacle, a visible field withdrawn from the 
gaze.  
																																																								37	Éric	Alliez,	The	Brain-Eye:	New	Histories	of	Modern	Painting	(London:	Rowman	&	Littlefield,	2016),	135.	38	Ibid.,	132.	
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Édouard Manet, Le Balcon, 1868. 
For instance, Manet’s Le Balcon (1868), furnishes a literal “portal to the outside,”39 
shifting the picture’s emphasis away from the constitution of the scene to that of the construction 
of the plane by placing its three principal figures on the balcony between the green persienne, 
multiplying the frame-effect. The structure of the picture plane enters into the visible scene as a 
veritable force of its own, rather than simply demarcating a stage or backdrop for the figures. In 
fact, this structure, the green of the shutters, the picture’s frame within the frame, has the 
responsibility of carrying the picture’s color, rather than setting the scene for colorful objects or 
																																																								39	Ibid.,	139.	
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figures. Further, the paradoxical flat staging of Le Balcon sets up a visible scene—at once 
entirely illuminated and totally impenetrable. The balcony and its exposed interior incite the gaze 
to entertain the spectacle, to enter into the scene, yet prohibits access, since the room is 
consumed by darkness. Between the forces of visibility and invisibility, outside and inside, 
Manet constructs his plane. The canvas itself is lodged in the midst of a spectacle that 
simultaneously opens to the eye with a radiant power of visibility and withdraws into 
indiscernibility where darkness threatens to absorb the visible scene. In the words of Éric Alliez, 
Le Balcon “constitutes an intermediary space between inside and outside, a limit upon which 
Manet sets up the membrane of the canvas—which he flattens in the extreme by endowing it 
with an architecture of horizontal and vertical lines.”40 Le Balcon’s architecture produces a grid-
effect—reproduced in the picture by the green railing—that pulls objects and figures in the plane 
toward the front and arranges them on a field composed of horizontal and vertical lines which 
covers the entire picture, intensifying its flatness. In contrast to the Classical procedure, which 
would oppose horizontal lines to the vertical in order to create the sensation of space in depth 
(e.g., Titian’s Venus of Urbino), the grid-structure of Manet’s Le Balcon performs a kind of 
weave of vertical and horizontal that matches the fabric of the canvas—the design or picture is 
still painted on a flat surface—but now the picture exists on the same level as that of the material 
through which it is constructed. That is to say, representation (of course) persists in Manet’s flat 
plane, but it is given—like a design in fabric—at the same level of its material assembly. In 
principle, scene and construction become indistinguishable. 
Furthermore, Manet’s “flat architecture” displaces color onto the structure itself—the 
green of the shutters. In effect, this inverts the traditional relation of figure and architecture 
																																																								40	Ibid.	
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whereby the figures carry color in a space delimited by architectural forms, the system of light 
and dark, of depth and shadow, that generates the spectacular space. In Le Balcon, on the 
contrary, color is assumed by the construction or structure, which frames the figures who are 
rendered black and white. What is more, light and dark are strictly delineated: light pushes 
forward toward the front, while darkness envelops the back of the picture in a partial refusal of 
depth. So much so that one can barely make out the fourth figure inside of the room because he 
is almost totally absorbed by darkness. As one moves toward the balcony from the interior, the 
figures become gradually more illuminated. The man positioned on the threshold behind the two 
women is appropriately adorned in a dark black suit, since he stands precisely at the point 
separating the illumination of the balcony with the void of the background. The contour of his 
figure, of his jacketed shoulder and even his torso, is almost impossible to distinguish from the 
darkness of the interior itself, such that he seems to be on the verge of, alternately, vanishing, 
swallowed as he is by the dark, or floating into appearance, emerging as he does from the 
darkness behind. In a similar way, the other figures on the balcony possess a spectral quality as 
they are suspended between light and darkness, like apparitions that float on the surface of the 
flat plane. Indeed, Foucault notes that the left foot of the figure on the right (Berthe Morisot’s 
sister) does not appear to be planted on the ground so much as it seems to swing in the air, 
resting on nothing.  
It is this spectral aspect brought out by the severe vertical partition of a “world of 
shadow” and a “world of light”41—of the interior and the exterior—which Foucault likens to the 
limit of life and death, that connects with an earlier observation made by Georges Bataille. The 
ghostly aura of Manet’s painting produces an impersonal effect, in which even scenes of death 
																																																								41	Michel	Foucault,	Manet	and	the	Object	of	Painting	(London:	Tate,	2010),	70.	
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and execution are painted with the indifferent eloquence of a still life.42 The significance of the 
scene is neutralized and dissolves into a “supreme play of light” now “handled with flawless 
technical proficiency;”43 recognizable forms still appear in the picture, but their meaning has 
been taken from them, as the canvas exhibits a power of indifference toward its objects and 
figures. This indifference is matched by the effect of silence on the plane, in which objects in the 
visible field do not communicate with each other or with the viewer by relaying a “message,” a 
“meaning” of the scene.44 Bataille identifies this silence with the death of (Classical) forms, 
which have been evacuated from the picture, but that persist like a shadow lingering over the 
Modernist canvas. Notably, René Magritte parodies this absence in his Perspective: Le Balcon 
de Manet (1950) by replacing the living figures in Manet’s picture with four wooden coffins. By 
substituting the figures for coffins, Magritte registers the subtlety of Manet’s own picture, in 
which the “characters” on the balcony are divested of the Classical forms and the staging that 
would animate them—giving the picture its spectral aura. The space itself becomes a “non-
place” where nothing happens, and which is occupied just as much by an absence as by a 
presence, by an impersonality that pervades its subjects.45 As Foucault says of Magritte’s Le 
Balcon de Manet: 
																																																								42	Bataille:	““Even in Manet’s eyes everything that went into the picture had been obliterated, 
and the result was in all respects comparable to a still life. Everything in Olympia glides towards 
indifference to beauty. […] With this supreme play of light handled with flawless technical 
proficiency, modern painting was born. Thus was majesty retrieved by the suppression of its 
outward blandishments—a majesty for everyone and no one, for everything and nothing, 
belonging simply to what is by reason of its being, and brought home by the power of painting” 
(Bataille, 74-5).	43	Georges	Bataille,	Manet:	Biographical	and	Critical	Study	(New	York:	Skira	Inc.,	1955),	75.	44	Bataille:	“The	silence	of	his	world	is	above	all	the	silence	born	of	an	outcry,	a	desperate	attempt	to	express	the	impossible”	(Bataille,	49).	45	In	a	similar	vein,	Éric	Alliez	claims	that	an	effect	of	Manet’s	impersonality	is	that	the	painter	paints	indefinite	articles—a	woman,	an	execution,	a	bar.	In	this	way,	Manet	paints:	“A	life	with	no	‘grace’	beyond	that	of	a	spectre	for	which	the	world-image	always	finds	itself	
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Invisibly contained between waxen oak planks, emptiness undoes the space composed by 
the volume of living bodies, the arrangement of clothing, the direction of the gaze and all 
the faces that are about to speak. The ‘non-place’ emerges ‘in person’—in place of 
persons and where no one is present any longer.46  
 
 
René Magritte, Perspective II, Le Balcon de Manet, 1950. 
The impersonality of Le Balcon is likewise captured by the discordant play of gazes, all 
intently looking in opposing directions, which indicate the presence of a spectacle outside of the 																																																																																																																																																																																		
taken	[tirée]	according	to	a	priority	that	no	longer	tolerates	any	seeing,	any	seer	except	for	impressions	of	nothingness;	and	withdrawn	[rétiree],	dismembered,	in	the	metonymic	mobility	that	will	be	captured	by	the	ghostly	enormity	of	the	mirror	of	A	Bar	at	the	Folies-
Bergère”	(Alliez,	153).	46	Michel	Foucault,	This	Is	Not	a	Pipe	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1983),	41.	
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frame, absent from the picture and withheld from the viewer.47 In the privation of visible 
spectacle, Manet’s picture is charged with an “enigmatic delicacy”48 as the intensity of gazes 
replaces the splendor of a Classical spectacle and “attains through absence what Goya, in a world 
freighted with solemnity and grave respect, attained through excess.”49 The visible is infused 
with the “presence” of invisibility where the powers of the eye confront a force that resists 
visibility and disrupts the Classical gaze. As the visible recedes into invisibility, what Foucault 
calls “gesture” invests Manet’s picture: 
[We] see nothing, we see only the gazes, not a place but a gesture and always the gestures 
of hands, folding hands, unfolding hands, hands actually unfolded; gloves put on, gloves 
about to be put on and hands without gloves, and it is this same turning gesture which is 
at root the gesture which makes the three figures. It is simply this circle of hands which 
unifies […] these divergent elements of the picture which is nothing other than the 
brilliance of invisibility itself.50  
 
In its refusal of Classical spectacle, Manet’s flat plane and the Modernist picture affront the gaze 
with “gesture,” as Foucault maintains, and, equally, with the loss of a privileged point of view 
from which the painter is supposed to paint and the viewer intended to look. Manet’s late Un Bar 
aux Folies-Bergère (1982) does this by collapsing the implied mirror-structure of Classical 
painting. The gigantic mirror of Un Bar covers the entire background of the picture, repelling 
penetrations of spatial depth outward toward the viewer, who no longer knows where to place 
herself in order to look at the picture, since the mirror presents a series of impossible reflections. 
 
																																																								47	Bataille:	“The	Balcony	is	based	so	wholly	on	the	divergent	stares	of	three	pairs	of	eyes	that	we	feel	ill	at	ease	before	them.	At	first	glance	we	see	nothing	here	but	a	retreat	into	the	insignificant;	only	later	do	we	wake	up	and	respond	to	the	sultry,	hallucinating,	wide-eyed	gaze	of	Berthe	Morisot,	seated	at	the	railing”	(Bataille,	95).		48	Max	Kozloff,	Renderings:	Critical	Essays	on	a	Century	of	Modern	Art	(New	York:	Simon	&	Schuster,	1968),	40.	49	Georges	Bataille,	Manet:	Biographical	and	Critical	Study	(New	York:	Skira	Inc.,	1955),	56.	50	Michel	Foucault,	Manet	and	the	Object	of	Painting	(London:	Tate,	2010),	71.	
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Édouard Manet, Un Bar aux Folies-Bergère, 1882. 
The viewer first encounters the figure of the woman from the front, as if facing the canvas from 
head-on, and she returns the viewer’s gaze. Nevertheless, in the reflection of her back in the 
mirror on the far right side of the canvas, she appears to turn her head and body in order to 
engage an approaching man with a hat, which would position the viewer not in front of the 
canvas at its center, but rather on the left side, looking at the woman diagonally, in profile—the 
man would then be approaching the woman from the right, and not opposite her. At the same 
time, the reflected image in the mirror seems to represent a frontal encounter between the two 
figures as if they were facing each other in the same way that the viewer faces the woman behind 
the counter. Thus, the viewer and the painter occupy (at least) two incompatible positions: the 
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first, directly opposite the woman as she appears in the foreground; the second, from another 
position entirely, one from which the woman appears in profile.51 Likewise, the red bottle at the 
bottom left of the picture is reflected in the mirror in two different ways: almost as a double of 
the original bottle in the foreground and also, more prominently, parallel with the woman’s right 
arm further back. 
In addition, as Foucault points out, it is impossible for there to be a figure in front of the 
woman (such as the approaching man seen in the mirror), since any object would cast a shadow 
on her figure and on the marble counter behind which she stands. Needless to say, such a shadow 
does not exist. It is, therefore, not only the reflection in the mirror that proves to be impossible, 
but, equally, the logic of the scene itself. Along these lines, Un Bar inverts the scene of Le 
Balcon insofar as the latter presents a multiplicity of discordant gazes in the picture which the 
viewer confronts from a fixed albeit uncertain position; Un Bar presents a single gaze (of the 
woman) that is multiplied in the picture through a series of incompatible perspectival scenarios 
that compel the viewer into a dynamism of gazes. Looking at Un Bar the viewer becomes, so to 
speak, an amalgamation of the three figures in Le Balcon—that is, forced to look in divergent 
directions at an uncertain spectacle. Un Bar constructs an enigmatic scene in which “it is not 
possible to know where the painter has placed himself in order to paint the picture as he has done 
it, and where we must place ourselves in order to see a spectacle such as this.”52 The painting of 
the scene, and not the painted scene itself, become what Foucault calls the “object of painting”: 																																																								51	In	his	book	on	Manet,	Michael	Fried	claims	that	Un	Bar	both	makes	explicit	the	“double	relation	to	the	beholder,”	which	characterizes	Manet’s	painting	more	generally,	and,	more	radically,	that	“the	identification	of	the	customer—the	barmaid-model’s	‘first’	beholder—as	someone	other	than	the	painter	suggests	that	in	this	final	major	work	Manet	in	effect	painted	his	own	absence	from	the	ternary	relationship	[figure-painter-viewer]	on	which,	I	have	suggested,	his	art	crucially	depended”	(Michael	Fried,	Manet’s	Modernism	or,	The	Face	
of	Painting	in	the	1860s	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1996),	345-6).	52	Michel	Foucault,	Manet	and	the	Object	of	Painting	(London:	Tate,	2010),	78.	
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the materials and artifice of painting disrupt the optical organization of Classical perspective and 
depth by divorcing the viewer from the presence of any decisive point of view.  
With the construction of the Modernist flat plane and its emphasis on the operational 
capacity of the canvas, the picture begins to exist on the same level as its material fabrication, 
spawning the movement toward a non-representational art. In Foucault’s final gloss on Manet he 
equates the latter’s creation of the “object of painting” with the movement toward abstraction 
that would follow him and eventually characterize Modernist painting in its European and 
American variants: 
Manet certainly did not invent non-representative painting because everything in Manet 
is representative, but he made a representational play of the fundamental material 
elements of the canvas. He was therefore inventing, if you like, the ‘picture-object’, the 
‘painting-object’, and this no doubt was the fundamental condition so that finally one day 
we can rid of representation itself and allow space to play with its pure and simple 
properties, its material properties.53 
 
Although Manet does not move beyond representative painting, he does move toward a type of 
painting that neutralizes the space in which figuration can occur through the elaboration of a flat 
plane. As Modernist painting moves toward abstraction there is no departure from Manet in 
principle; abstraction follows from the flattening of the picture plane and the new expressive life 
of materials unleashed on the canvas, more than from an abstract rejection of figuration in 
general. Following Greenberg, “Modernist painting in its latest phase [abstraction] has not 
abandoned the representation of recognizable objects in principle. What it has abandoned in 
principle is the representation of the kind of space that recognizable objects can inhabit.”54 It is 
the denial of this “kind of space” that Manet ushers in, bringing the materials of painting to the 
surface in his refusal of Classical spectacle and its perspectival practices.  																																																								53	Ibid.,	79.	54	Clement	Greenberg,	Clement	Greenberg:	The	Collected	Essays	and	Criticism,	Volume	4	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1993),	87,	our	emphasis.	
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 In this light, the flatbed canvas or “work surface” that Steinberg invokes with respect to 
Dubuffet and Rauschenberg, whose “non-art” materials are fixed to the canvas (e.g., dirt, 
newspapers, an old shirt, etc.), are not departures from the Modernist flat plane, so much as they 
constitute its literal enactment. That is, these particular flatbed canvases fulfill the imperative of 
Modernist painting to set its material elements against the constraints of “illusionistic” picture 
making. With the incorporation of found materials in Dubuffet or Rauschenberg, the painted 
surface declares itself to be what it always was: the organizing space of material elements 
arranged on a flat plane. The latter, the construction of the flat plane, is the precondition of 
Modernist thickness. A fact made most apparent in Dubuffet’s Olympia (1950), in which the 
 
Jean Dubuffet, Olympia, 1950. 
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figure-ground relation is totally dissolved, becoming a picture whose materiality overtakes the 
surface and produces a tactility irreducible to the sensation of the figure in the Classical picture. 
Further, the flatbed of Dubuffet—and with it the majority of Modernist painting—sets materials 
against the boundaries of the aesthetic canvas in an attempt to escape its organizing field and 
liberate an expressive power of matter distinct from the “illusionistic” space of forms. Dubuffet’s 
Olympia, as much as Manet’s own, sets matter against forms by means of the flat plane’s 
material construction—a plane that, at once, permits the untethering of the expressive forces of 
materials and keeps in check this expressivity, bounding it within the limits of the frame.  
From Manet, in this light, the Modernist painter was already trying to leave the easel and 
escape the restrictions of the small canvas, which the weight of materials was already beginning 
to bring down. Jackson Pollock prominently took the next step in this logic with his transition to 
the mural painting in the 1940s. Pollock’s 1943, Mural, is the initiation of the painter’s attempt 
to break with the confines of easel painting and with it the intimacy of the small form picture. 
The movement toward the mural, however, is not merely extensive—it is not a matter of easel 
painting on a larger scale. Rather, breaking with the easel demands more than a bigger picture. 
 
Jackson Pollock, Mural, 1943. 
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To this end, Pollock places the canvas on the ground and throws or drips the paint onto it. Harold 
Rosenberg infamously described this technique as “Action Painting.”55 In effect, Pollock 
transforms the canvas into a field of action in which the painter “performs” by manually 
applying paint to the canvas through the movements of the arm and the gestures of the hand. This 
method counters the compositional technique of the small form easel picture where either the 
painter’s hand traces an outline drawn on the canvas or draws directly with the brush the contour 
of figurative forms and geometric shapes; here the hand breaks free of its control by the eye—it 
no longer follows an optical model—and becomes an autonomous entity in its own right. The 
gestural automatism of the hand in Action Painting does not pass through the eye and the 
sovereign optical organization of Classical forms: Action Painting “reverses the classical 
subordination, it subordinates the eye to the hand, it imposes the hand on the eye, and it replaces 
the horizon with a ground.”56 The effect of this manual automatism is a perspectival 
disorganization that stretches across the entire canvas, precluding the recognition of optical 
forms. Pollock’s Action Painting is not merely an extension of the easel to the dimensions of the 
wall, but an updated conception of the Modernist flat plane that constructs new relations between 
the painter and his or her material. 
Moreover, the Abstract Expressionist painter’s tools change: they are no longer the easel 
and the brush, which maintain an essential link with the optical organization of the picture plane. 
Instead, as the hand is liberated, it “makes use of sticks, sponges, rags, syringes” (Deleuze, 86), 
instruments that engender a tactile effect. These instruments are not only means of applying paint 
to the canvas, but of materially manipulating it by moving it around, smearing it, or soaking it 
																																																								55	See	Harold	Rosenberg’s	article,	“The	American	Action	Painters.”		56	Gilles	Deleuze,	Francis	Bacon:	The	Logic	of	Sensation	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2002),	87.	
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up. The result is a canvas that is optically disfigured but materially expressive—the sensation 
that the painting generates stems from its use and deployment of materials no longer bound by 
representational or even figurative forms. The latter are a hallmark of what Greenberg identified 
as “painterly abstraction”: “lose, rapid handling, or the look of it; masses that blotted and fused 
instead of shapes that stayed distinct; large and conspicuous rhythms; broken color; uneven 
saturations or densities of paint, exhibited brush, knife, or finger marks.”57 In this kind of 
“painterly” painting the presence of the hand shows through the optical plane and begins to act 
on its own, apart from the optical recognition of shapes and figures and the intention of Classical 
forms.58 
Pollock’s “all-over” paintings of 1947-50 liquidate the control exercised over the hand, 
according to a pre-composed optical model, by placing the painter in direct contact with his 
materials and the paint he “throws” or flings onto the canvas, thereby short-circuiting the stage of 
composition. Consequently, this practice liberates line from contour—that is, from the 
delimitation of shapes or figures. Number One of 1948, for instance, perfects Pollock’s 
“continuous, all-over line which loops and snarls time and again upon itself almost until the 
entire surface of the canvas is covered by it.”59 Since it bounds nothing, Pollock’s abstract line 
homogenizes the pictorial field and directs attention to nowhere in particular. The whole surface 
																																																								57	Clement	Greenberg,	Clement	Greenberg:	The	Collected	Essays	and	Criticism,	Volume	4	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1993),	123.	58	Greenberg	himself	is	too	quick	to	minimize	this	manual	aspect	in	order	to	constitute	the	purely	optical	space	of	the	Modernist	picture—a	space	where	tactility	fades	away.	For	Greenberg,	and	Fried	after	him,	Pollock	establishes	an	optical	field,	which	is	distinguished	“from	the	structured,	essentially	tactile	pictorial	field	of	previous	modernist	painting	from	Cubism	to	de	Kooning	and	even	Hans	Hofmann”	(Michael	Fried,	“Three	American	Painters”	[1965]	in	Art	and	Objecthood:	Essays	and	Reviews	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1998),	224).		59	Michael	Fried,	“Three	American	Painters”	[1965]	in	Art	and	Objecthood:	Essays	and	
Reviews	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1998),	223.	
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Jackson Pollock, Number One, 1948. 
of the canvas, covered by the all-over line, dissolves the figure/ground distinction because no 
part of the picture can be prioritized above another. It is not only that the painting attains a non-
representational line, but also that it surpasses the geometrical abstraction of Cubism and 
Neoplasticism; Pollock’s all-over abstraction equally dispenses with the representation of objects 
(the description of contour) and the bounding of shapes. As Fried says, “Pollock has managed to 
free line not only from its function of representing objects in the world, but also from its task of 
describing or bounding shapes or figures, whether abstract or representational, on the surface of 
the canvas.”60   
																																																								60	Ibid.,	224.	
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Given the nature of this all-over line (as Fried describes it), it bears asking why Steinberg 
regards Pollock as a nature painter.61 The issue is not one of subject matter—Pollock’s paintings 
do not necessarily look like natural objects; rather the picture plane’s orientation retains the same 
“psychic address”62 as the Classical picture: it presents a “worldspace” to a viewer. The 
presentation of this “worldspace” is not a question of figuration or abstraction, but of the picture 
plane’s verticality. Pollock’s all-over line charts a course for the wall, but it stays within the 
confines of the easel in which the restrictions of the frame, the tension produced by the edges, 
force the painting into a vertical position that meets the eye of the human viewer who looks at 
the picture as if it were a window through which a world could be glimpsed. The Pollock picture 
may, as Greenberg contends, eliminate the kind of space in which representational objects could 
appear, but it still preserves the vertical orientation of the easel painting and, by extension, the de 
facto representational address of the picture. In front of the all-over picture the viewer cannot 
recognize objects optically (Greenberg’s point), but she still occupies a representational position 
with respect to the canvas—the viewer’s gaze is scrambled by the abstract style, but she 
continues to look at the painting as if it were a natural object. 
 In fact, Steinberg’s judgment is not entirely opposed to Pollock’s own. In an artist’s 
statement of 1947, Pollock makes clear that his work occurs between the easel and the mural, not 
at the expense of the latter: 
I believe the easel picture is to be a dying form, and the tendency of modern feeling is 
towards the wall picture or mural. I believe the time is not yet ripe for a full transition 
from easel to mural. The pictures I contemplate painting would constitute a halfway state, 
																																																								61	See:	Leo	Steinberg,	Other	Criteria:	Confrontations	with	Twentieth-Century	Art	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1972),	84.	62	Ibid.	
		
37	
and an attempt to point out the direction of the future, without arriving there 
completely.63 
 
Staged in between the easel and the wall in a “halfway state,” Pollock’s all-over style refuses the 
viewer optical recognition of contoured shapes and objects, typical of the small form easel 
picture, but addresses the viewer (at least according to Steinberg) with a picture plane just as 
confined by the laws of horizontal and vertical as the easel. In other words, the shadow of natural 
forms pervades even Pollock’s most abstract paintings, and the specter of figuration lurks 
underneath his all-over line. This tendency is supported by the fact that Pollock never abandoned 
figuration entirely during the 1947-50 drip paintings. In paintings like Cut-Out (1949), White 
Cockatoo (1948), and Out of the Web (1949), Pollock does not so much “re-introduce” figuration 
into the all-over picture: on the contrary, he brings to the surface a tendency (i.e., figuration) 
latent in his abstract line. Paradoxically, figuration persists even in its ostensible absence; 
Pollock’s drip paintings all seem to seek the contour, to search for shapes and figures—and, 
occasionally, to find them. Pollock’s “best” paintings, from this perspective, happen when the 
search fails—as in Number One of 1948—and the all-over line envelops the entire plane, 
deactivating any privileged point, and thereby neutralizing any lure for the gaze. This makes the 
Pollock picture of 1947-50 a supremely ambiguous space, poised somewhere between the 
collapse of figurative representation and its uncertain reappearance. However, figuration in these 
paintings—and this is the point—does not appear as a supplement to the all-over line or 
something added on top of Pollock’s abstraction; on the contrary, figuration arises almost 
organically from the abstract line. 
																																																								63	Jackson	Pollock,	“Application	for	Guggenheim	Fellowship,	1947,”	in	Jackson	Pollock:	
Interviews,	Articles	and	Reviews	(New	York:	The	Museum	of	Modern	Art,	2002),	17.	
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Jackson Pollock, Cut-Out, 1949. 
Pollock’s Cut-Out undoubtedly demonstrates this point. In this painting, Pollock includes 
figuration in the picture literally through its absence—the figure is precisely “cut out” of the 
canvas painted in all-over style. Just as the all-over line demands the withdrawal of figuration, 
figuration comes back into the picture from the very point of its departure. As Fried remarks, 
“The figure is something we don’t see—it is, literally, where we don’t see—rather than 
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something, a shape or object in the world, we do see.”64 The figure becomes a “blind spot, or 
defect in our visual apparatuses,”65 the result of the disfigured, abstract space. The point here is 
not only that recognizable objects appear in the all-over drip paintings (if they do), but that the 
picture plane remains oriented in such a way that it abides by the vertical alignment of human 
form. Thus, the most abstract of Pollock canvases easily become “nature scenes,” and one cannot 
but help see figurative forms in the midst of optical abstraction. In this way, the viewer is refused 
optical recognition at the level of composition—her vision is even disrupted or defective as Fried 
suggests—but she receives the picture in the same way as a Classical painting, permitting the 
representation of a “worldspace” back into the picture. The irony of Cut-Out is that the abstract 
shape in the middle of the canvas takes a vaguely anthropomorphic form, suggesting the picture 
plane’s more general anthropological character. Indeed, Greenberg attributes this 
anthropocentrism to the practice of Modernist picture making as a whole: 
[T]he making of pictures means, among other things, the deliberate creating or choosing 
of a flat surface, and the deliberate circumscribing and limiting of it. This deliberateness 
is precisely what Modernist painting harps on: the fact, that is, that the limiting conditions 
of art are altogether human conditions.66   
 
It is this vertical orientation of the Modernist picture according to an erect human posture that 
Steinberg’s concept of the flatbed as a screen disorients.  
The flatbed, then, serves a double role: to reevaluate Modernist painting in terms of 
“thickness” by means of the tactility of materials and the gesturality of the hand against their 
Classical effacement; and to indicate a new type of painting that is no longer “thick” or manual, 
or in the process of becoming dramatically less so. On the one hand, the flatbed conceived as a 																																																								64	Michael	Fried,	“Three	American	Painters”	[1965]	in	Art	and	Objecthood:	Essays	and	
Reviews	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1998),	227-8.	65	Ibid.,	228.	66	Clement	Greenberg,	Clement	Greenberg:	The	Collected	Essays	and	Criticism,	Volume	4	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1993),	92.	
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“work surface”67 of objects, as a picture plane that “lets the world in,”68 belongs to a 
reinterpretation of Modernist painting that supplements Greenberg’s model of pictorial flatness. 
On this level, the inroads of “art” and “non-art,” aesthetic forms and material elements are 
extended to the point of their indistinction, and the tactile quality of the Modernist plane is 
elevated to an expressive state, independent of Classical composition and the intentionality of 
forms. However, Steinberg also teases another dimension of the flatbed. At the end of his essay, 
in a reference to the work of Andy Warhol, he envisions the flatbed as a “receptor surface” or 
“screen” upon which “data” are collected and dispersed—like a table or “matrix of 
information.”69 This aspect of the flatbed ought be distinguished from the previous one: it denies 
the “thickness” of materials and neutralizes the techniques of the hand and brush. The flatbed as 
screen wipes away the “thickness” of materials and effaces the gestures of the hand, becoming a 
machinic process that operates on the “immateriality” of light and color.  
Steinberg identities this painting as “post-Modern” at the conclusion of his essay, but it is 
only “postmodern” in the sense that the Modern is “post-Classical.” That is, this “postmodern” 
painting generates its own specific problems and complexities, which are more than just the 
(linear) outgrowth of the categories of Modernist painting. Because this new kind of painting 
functions as a screen and no longer as a “worldspace,” its particular “criteria” demand to be 
thought in their own right. It is in this spirit that the following section considers the work of 
Andy Warhol’s 1960s silkscreens with and beyond the terms of the flatbed itself. 
 
																																																								67	Leo	Steinberg,	Other	Criteria:	Confrontations	with	Twentieth-Century	Art	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1972),	85.	68	Ibid.,	90.	69	Ibid.,	85.	
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Andy Warhol, Marilyn, 1967. 
Warhol and the Silkscreen  
With the development of the flatbed and, more specifically, the silkscreen, the nature of the 
painted image undergoes a metamorphosis. When the picture plane eradicates pictorial depth in 
order to become a pure surface of information—in which even the opposition surface/depth is 
surpassed—the painted image neither comes from the world nor indexes natural objects; it is a 
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seizure of light. That is to say, painting becomes not the painting of objects in the field of human 
vision (the evocation of “natural” perception), but the fixing of images divorced from a 
phenomenal referent. Hence the importance of the canvas as a screen: a screen that captures 
particles, never objects, and whose referent (if one exists) is a universe of light-particles and their 
wave-flows, never a phenomenological world.  
Following Foucault, this new kind of painting is immersed into a “great sea of images,”70 
in which there is no outside to the image-flow or to the “anonymous flux of events.”71 The new 
painting does not withdraw from the image-flux, but rather becomes a “relay in this endless 
circulation.”72 With the figure of the flatbed, Steinberg invokes the model of “optical noise” in 
order to diagnose the incursion of aberrant material and heterogeneous images onto the once 
“pure” optical plane. “The waste and detritus of communication—like radio transmission with 
interference; noise and meaning on the same wavelength, visually on the same flatbed plane.”73 
Thus, the flatbed turns away from the solitary isolation and ascetic purification of the picture, 
acting, in this way, as a force of intensive deframing through its disarticulation of the vertical 
orientation of the plane, which mobilizes a dislocation of the image from its distillation on the 
canvas in an opening to the outside of an “autonomous transhumance of the image,” that 
Foucault invokes with respect to Gérard Fromanger’s “photogenic painting.” In Foucault’s 
words: 
[Fromanger’s photogenic painting] agrees to become a thoroughfare [lieu de passage], an 
infinite transition, a busy and crowded painting. And in opening itself up to so many 
events that it relaunches, it incorporates all the techniques of the image: it re-establishes 																																																								70	Michel	Foucault,	“Photogenic	Painting”	[1975],	in	Gérard	Fromanger:	Photogenic	Painting	(London:	Black	Dog,	1999),	91.	71	Ibid.,	92.	72	Ibid.,	91.	73	Leo	Steinberg,	Other	Criteria:	Confrontations	with	Twentieth-Century	Art	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1972),	88.	
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its relationship with them to connect to them, to amplify them, to multiply them, to 
disturb them or deflect them. Around it emerges an open field in which the painter can no 
longer be alone, nor can painting be a solitary sovereign.74  
 
Following this conception, the new painting opens up its optic field by disarticulating the 
isolation of an image to become “the image of an image” and a “thoroughfare” of their transition. 
The same qualification is made by Steinberg as a counter-measure against the presentation of a 
worldspace: 
The picture conceived as the image of an image. It’s a conception which guarantees that 
the presentation will not be directly that of a worldspace, and that it will nevertheless 
admit any experience as the matter of representation. And it readmits the artist in the 
fullness of his human interests, as well as the artist-technician.75  
 
However, Steinberg does not go as far as Foucault, since he retains the flatbed as a field or plane 
of representation, even if this plane is made heterogeneous and non-hierarchical, in keeping with 
Steinberg’s (representational) models of the printing press and the newspaper.76 In contrast, the 
flatbed qua screen should be extended to the limit of its representational capacities, functioning, 
in this way, as a tensor of the pictorial surface, moving the painting toward a beyond of 
representation, setting into variation its forms and materials on an asignifying surface which is 
that of the flatbed itself. This asignifying surface becomes like that of the screens of 
contemporary science, which map (or capture) an insubstantial universe of particles, whose only 
“phenomenal” existence is that of their computized trace registered on the screen. Here, in the 
particle universe, images are not reflective surfaces, and they do not indicate a (“real,” 
																																																								74	Michel	Foucault,	“Photogenic	Painting”	[1975],	in	Gérard	Fromanger:	Photogenic	Painting	(London:	Black	Dog,	1999),	102-3.	75	Leo	Steinberg,	Other	Criteria:	Confrontations	with	Twentieth-Century	Art	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1972),	91.	76	See:	Leo	Steinberg,	Other	Criteria:	Confrontations	with	Twentieth-Century	Art	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1972),	82.	
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substantial) world that exists beyond them. They are aggregates of light-particles generated by 
machines.   
These operational images (indeed, their very existence) are inseparably tied to the 
technical apparatuses that generate them, overturning the representative regime characteristic of 
Western art (and metaphysics)—displacing the Classical reference to Nature and the humanist 
reference to Man. These images exist in a continuous relationship with the screen’s operational 
capacities; what develops on the screen is not produced by an encounter with an exterior 
phenomenal world, but engendered by the internal functioning of its own technical system. This 
eclipses the human orientation of the picture plane (pace Steinberg) and the anthropomorphism 
of picture making (pace Greenberg) in favor of the technical immanence the machine. The 
maneuvers of the painter’s hand give way to the immaterial operations of the screen that smooth 
the thickness of the Modernist plane and suppress the expressivity of its materials.   
The silkscreen’s affront to Modernist painterly values is multiplied by its technique, 
which comes from the world of advertising and commodities—not from the world of art. Due to 
this commercial pre-history of the silkscreen and Warhol’s use of it, many of his contemporary 
critics of Pop art identified a break with the European tradition. John Coplans, for instance, 
accounts for the novelty of Warhol—and of Pop more generally—in terms of a total refusal of 
the expressive techniques of American post-War painting and its precursor, European (especially 
French) painting. Pop employs, 
a series of painting devices which derive their force in good measure from the fact that 
they have virtually no association with a European tradition. […] For these artists, the 
abstract expressionist concern with gesture, with the expressive possibilities of sheer 
materials is out—all Expressionistic concerns (and Impressionistic ones as well) abstract 
or otherwise—are out.77  																																																								77	John	Coplans,	“American	Painting	and	Pop	Art”	[1963],	in	Provocations:	Writings	by	John	
Coplans	(London:	London	Projects,	1996),	23.	
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Against the “expressive possibilities of sheer materials,” as Coplans explains, Pop interpolates 
new “subject matter,” which disrupts the fine art context of the European tradition. “The very 
essence of this new art lies precisely in its complete break from a whole tradition of European 
esthetics. This is accomplished by the particular choice of subject matter which is put into a new 
fine art context. This is the transformation.”78 
The break is more nuanced, according to Robert Rosenblum: it is not only a shift away 
from European painting and Abstraction, but more particularly with the “American old masters 
of the 1950s,” principally Pollock and de Kooning’s work where the brush and the material 
density of the paint become predominant. In Warhol, the reference to nature is curtailed insofar 
as the “late Romantic imagery referring to remote-myth and sublime nature is replaced by the 
machine-made objects from ugly urban environments.”79 Moreover, Warhol actively suppresses 
the expressivity of materials that define the Modernist picture: the “[g]ently stained or shaggily 
encrusted brushstrokes are negated by the insistence upon hygienic, impersonal surfaces.”80 
However, the gap between the Warhol silkscreen and its contemporary, “post-painterly” abstract 
painting of the 1960s, is not unbridgeable. In particular the work of Color Field artists like 
Kenneth Noland, Frank Stella, Jules Olitski and Larry Poons come to reject, or at least move 
away from, the expressive techniques of previous American Abstraction and Action Painting.81 
As Rosenblum suggests, Warhol shares with Color Field: 
																																																								78	Ibid.	79	Robert	Roenblum,	“Pop	Art	and	Non-Pop	Art”	[1965],	in	On	Modern	American	Art:	
Selected	Essays	by	Robert	Rosenblum	(New	York:	Harry	N.	Abrams,	Inc.,	1999),	187.	80	Ibid.	81	Donald	Judd	also	suggests	the	congruity	between	Warhol	and	abstraction	once	the	exaggerated	importance	of	subject	matter	is	pushed	aside.	He	writes,	“it is easy to imagine 
Warhol’s paintings without such subject matter, simply as “over-all” paintings of repeated 
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a sensibility to bold magnifications of simple, regularized forms—rows of dots, stripes, 
chevrons, concentric circles—to taut, brushless surfaces that often reject traditional oil 
techniques in favor of new industrial media of metallic, plastic, enamel quality; to 
expansive areas of flat, unmodulated color.82  
 
Rosenblum’s comparison not only draws out the complicity of aim between Warhol’s work and 
newer abstract painting (two spheres that are often kept apart), but also that the novelty of the 
silkscreen painting does not reside in their “subject matter”—in contrast to the claim made by 
Coplans. Proper to Warhol’s Pop is the way in which it treats the image and not the imagery as 
such. That is to say, the significance of Warhol’s silkscreen images is not that they incorporate 
mass-produced objects into painting. Rather than a new subject for painting, Warhol offers the 
“coincidence of style and subject,” which concerns not only “what is painted, but also the way it 
is painted.”83 Warhol paints the objects and icons of mass reproduction in a style that matches 
their reproducibility—a style that is inseparable from the machine and its technical operations. 
As Coplans writes, “the transformation of the image is effected in the technique.”84  
The silkscreen painting is embedded in a technical process from which it cannot be 
extracted. This fundamentally transforms the function of painting. Two principal aspects of this 
transformation brought about by the silkscreen are the decreasing importance of the hand and the 
line in the process of picture making, and the status of the frame, which is no longer an integral 
aspect of the image’s production. Warhol’s portrait silkscreen work of the 1960s, in particular, 
rejects the system of light and dark demanded by the line and drawing (even Pollock’s abstract 
line as Fried describes it), which suppresses color. In Pollock’s all-over paintings color follows 																																																																																																																																																																																		
elements” (Donald Judd, “In the Galleries: Andy Warhol” [1963], in Pop Art: A Critical History 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 268).		82	Robert	Roenblum,	“Pop	Art	and	Non-Pop	Art”	[1965],	in	On	Modern	American	Art:	
Selected	Essays	by	Robert	Rosenblum	(New	York:	Harry	N.	Abrams,	Inc.,	1999),	189.	83	Ibid.,	186.	84	John	Coplans,	“Andy	Warhol:	The	Art”	[1970],	in	Provocations:	Writings	by	John	Coplans	(London:	London	Projects,	1996),	102.	
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the line; color is tethered to the abstraction of the line itself and does not primarily assert a force 
of its own. Equally, the Warhol silkscreen dispenses with the “action” conception of Abstract 
Expressionism—the automatism of the hand in Pollock and also the handling of the brush in de 
Kooning. In Warhol, this manual automatism becomes a machinic automatism; the hand and its 
various techniques of handling paint are transferred to the technologies of reproduction. The 
silkscreen does not so much generate or craft an image, but rather screens it and varies the 
color.85 In Warhol’s silkscreens, the problem of edge tension inherent to the frame and the line in 
Pollock and much of Abstract Expressionism is not “solved,” as it is made irrelevant; the edges 
of the silkscreen become “convenient more than critical.”86 In principle, the line of the frame can 
be drawn anywhere and the screen surface could be extended to infinity. As John Coplans writes, 
“the edge is always positioned as an outgrowth of the margins of the image on the screen.”87 
Typically the edge is determined after the image is screened, so that the making of the picture 
curtails the tension at the edges (in contrast with Color Field) and precludes drawing 
altogether—the machine mechanizes these procedures. In collaboration with the machine, 
Warhol selects the color of the screen (including black and white); its application is handled 
mechanically. 
 The image itself, acting as a readymade, is submitted to a principle of repetition that is 
carried out by the machine in which it loses its essential identity and is divested of any 
significance in itself. Though not a silkscreen, Warhol’s Campbell’s Soup Cans of 1962 
demonstrates the force of repetition that his images undergo: they are given over to the power of 																																																								85	John	Coplans:	“Since	a	major	part	of	the	decisions	in	the	silk-screen	process	are	made	outside	the	painting	itself	(even	the	screens	for	color	can	be	mechanically	prepared	in	advance),	making	the	painting	is	then	a	question	of	screening	the	image	or	varying	the	color”	(Coplans,	102).	86	Ibid.,	103.	87	Ibid.	
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the series, which strips the individual image or object of its uniqueness. The soup cans as a series 
of hand painted images simulate reproduction—a process that is mechanized by the technology 
of the silkscreen. Even Warhol’s Double Elvis of 1963 exhibits this effect of serialization and 
repetition that overtakes the individual image. The image is doubled, as its title suggests, yet one 
 
Andy Warhol, Double Elvis, 1963. 
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can make out the traces of a third image just barely visible on the left side of the canvas. This 
displays the serial effect of Warhol’s images, even when they “stand alone.” Double Elvis 
dramatizes the reproducibility of the image, which is always in the process of multiplying and 
extending outside of the boundaries of the frame. In this painting, the borders of the screen cut 
off the image of the icon—the top of his head and the bottom of his feet cannot be seen. The 
image loses any unity or consistency in itself, just as the frame collapses into the image, losing 
its status as an (exterior) organizing element of the image. The images of Elvis are not “framed” 
by the boundaries of the screen; they are caught arbitrarily within the field, becoming a 
collection of data on a smooth surface. The serialization of images generated through machinic 
repetition overturns the unity or identity of the image and, effectively, “deframes” the picture, 
since the screen is not oriented by a consistency outside it, beyond its surface, which would 
recognize an image and bound it—that is, “frame” it. Within the immanence of the screen, the 
image and the frame become indistinct. By means of the mechanical actions of the silkscreen, 
framing by the eye and the hand is abandoned; the image is submitted to serial repetition that 
deprives it of its essence; and the picture plane becomes a field in which information is collected 
and dispersed. 
 This machinic process of painting fundamentally changes the status of the painter as well 
as the picture’s viewer. The painter no longer creates an image, but rather varies light and color 
directly on the screen; color is no longer bound to the line, and it does not denote or embellish 
shapes. Color in Warhol’s silkscreens becomes what Coplans calls, “colored light,”88 in which 
the image on the screen gives way to the immateriality of color on a “light-reflective surface,” 
producing something like a monochrome field even if the screen is populated by an image or 																																																								88	John	Coplans,	“Andy	Warhol:	The	Art”	[1970],	in	Provocations:	Writings	by	John	Coplans	(London:	London	Projects,	1996),	105.	
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various different colors.89 Warhol’s 1962 Gold Marilyn literally combines the monochrome 
screen with a portrait of the icon, immersing the image into a field of vibrant, even vulgar, color.  
 
Andy Warhol, Gold Marilyn, 1962. 
																																																								89	See:	Benjamin	H.	D.	Buchloh,	“Andy	Warhol’s	One-Dimensional	Art:	1956-1966”	[1989],	in	Andy	Warhol	(Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press,	2001),	17.	
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In this painting, the image of Monroe in the exact center of the canvas performs a double role. 
On the one hand, against Modernist thickness, “it recedes into the fibers of the canvas, from 
which it once protruded,”90 drawing the intensity of color inward toward the center and 
dispersing it in the animated visual display of the image itself; on the other hand, the image 
exerts a positive charge, repelling the forces of color away from its saturation in the center, 
multiplying the power of the gold monochrome as the color bounces off the image and moves 
outward to create an enveloping, intensive field. But this is not a relation of figure and ground. 
The monochrome does not provide the backdrop for the image, nor does the image of Monroe 
exactly organize the gold field. On the contrary, the relationship between the monochrome field 
and the image takes place entirely on the surface of the screen, which flattens the space in such a 
way that the image and field cease to be differentiated. This effect is heightened by the fact that 
the image lacks a background—there is nothing to orient the object in space or delineate its 
surroundings. The image blends into the color of the screen itself, tearing it away from any 
context that would elevate the image above another part of the screen (prioritizing it) or give it a 
significance (or identity) of its own. This technique differs, in principle, from the procedures of 
cinema and photography, “which localize space by delineating subject, surroundings, 
background, etc.; Warhol’s paintings [on the contrary] present images in a surrounding space 
that is felt or perceived as a continuum.”91 Because the literal background of the image 
disappears, the image enters into relation with a virtual continuum composed of light and color 
of which it also forms a part. Furthermore, the image in Gold Marilyn parodies Classical 
perspective and its use of the vanishing point. Here, nothing vanishes; the image in the center 
																																																								90	Max	Kozloff,	“Art”	[1963],	The	Nation,	December	7,	1963,	p.	402.	91	John	Coplans,	“Andy	Warhol:	The	Art”	[1970],	in	Provocations:	Writings	by	John	Coplans	(London:	London	Projects,	1996),	103.	
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enters into total visibility and allows nothing to escape the screen and the monochrome field. At 
the same time, the field is emptied of “all manufactured visual incident,” to become a surface of 
color.92 The constitution of the monochrome surface is enhanced by Warhol’s specific use of 
industrial enamel, which gives the canvas a glossy yet transparent finish that heightens the 
visibility of the image and makes the field more “immaterial,” like a plane of glass. Paired with 
the enamel is the use of acrylic paint, which has less pigment than traditional oil and takes less 
time to dry, meaning that images painted in acrylic are both more clear and more distinct because 
colors do not blend into one another as in oil. The result in Warhol is a transparent surface of 
direct color, detached from representation, by which the very banality of the image sets off the 
“lyricism” of the color.93 In this way, the image on the screen becomes a prop for the intensive 
forces of color and no longer an essential element of painting—which is why there is no edge 
tension in Warhol. The edges of the Modernist plane become the flattened surface of the 
silkscreen from which there is no “off-screen,” since the visual display is reducible to the internal 
operations of the machine that produce it and is no longer the analogue of a visible world. 
Thus, like the painter, the viewer no longer has a place in the picture or outside of it. As 
the picture plane changes its orientation, becoming a screen of information that no longer 
presents an image as a worldspace, the privileged site from which the viewer is supposed to look 
at the painting vanishes. It is not merely that a stable position is refused to the viewer, but that 
the viewer does not even have a place (however plural or ironic) from which she can look at the 
picture. As Frederic Jameson observes, nothing “in th[e] [silkscreen] painting organizes even a 
minimal place for the viewer, who confronts it at the turning of a museum corridor or gallery 																																																								92	Benjamin	H.	D.	Buchloh,	“Andy	Warhol’s	One-Dimensional	Art:	1956-1966”	[1989],	in	
Andy	Warhol	(Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press,	2001),	17.	93	John	Coplans,	“Andy	Warhol:	The	Art”	[1970],	in	Provocations:	Writings	by	John	Coplans	(London:	London	Projects,	1996),	96.	
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with all the contingency of some inexplicable natural object.”94 In its very literalness, the Warhol 
image possesses an enigmatic quality that resists the viewer’s gaze and her interpretation. At the 
same time, it “has no surreal, metaphorical or symbolic edge.”95 It is an image for no one in 
particular and it offers no meaning beyond that of its literal appearance on the screen. 
David Antin writes of the “deteriorated image” of Warhol’s silkscreens, in which the 
“image can be said to barely exist” as it moves further from the materiality of paint and the 
canvas toward surface color. This “deterioration,” for Antin, describes the progression of 
Warhol’s silkscreen process as a whole:  
Here there is actually a series of images of images, beginning from the translation of the 
light reflectivity of a human face into the precipitation of silver from a photo-sensitive 
emulsion, this negative image developed, re-photographed into a positive image with 
reversal of light and shadow, and consequent blurring, further translated by telegraphy, 
engraved on a plate and printed through a crude screen with low-grade ink on newsprint, 
and this final blurring and silkscreening in an imposed lilac color on canvas. What is left? 
The sense that there is something out there one recognizes and yet can’t see it. Before the 
Warhol canvases we are trapped in a ghastly embarrassment.96  
 
The silkscreen process in its entirety moves progressively away from the “reality” of the image 
and toward a “nearly obliterated image.”97 Marilyn Diptych (1962) stages this paradoxical 
disappearance: on the one hand, the images on the left side, set in a series, seem to burst forth 
into a kind of total presence of an all too visible transparency; yet, the images on the right side in 
black and white withdraw, becoming dark or extremely light. Here, the effect of the series is not 
simply to multiply the image to the point where its identity dissolves, but also to indicate its 
immateriality and weightlessness. The silkscreen departs from pictorial depth by dispensing with 																																																								94	Frederic	Jameson,	“Culture:	The	Cultural	Logic	of	Late	Capitalism”	[1991],	in	On&By	Andy	
Warhol	(Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press,	2016),	166.	95	John	Coplans,	“Andy	Warhol:	The	Art”	[1970],	in	Provocations:	Writings	by	John	Coplans	(London:	London	Projects,	1996),	107.	96	David	Antin,	cited	in	Leo	Steinberg,	Other	Criteria:	Confrontations	with	Twentieth-Century	
Art	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1972),	91.	97	Ibid.	
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Andy Warhol, Marilyn Diptych, 1962. 
the image’s background and from the thickness of the canvas by making it smooth. 
Another aspect of this deterioration is the use of color in the silkscreen. John Coplans 
identifies the quasi-abstract use of color in Warhol as “color slippage,” in which color extends 
beyond or “slips” outside of the contour of the form it ostensibly denotes. In Liz # 6 (1963), for 
example, “Warhol deliberately ensures that the color areas are larger than the natural forms they 
are designed to denote.”98 The red of the lips and the blue of the eyes detach themselves from the 
object(s) they apparently “belong” to, so that they become autonomous traits of color. According 
to Coplans, this “heightens the unreality of the image.”99 In this way, the Warhol silkscreen 
																																																								98	John	Coplans,	“Andy	Warhol:	The	Art”	[1970],	in	Provocations:	Writings	by	John	Coplans	(London:	London	Projects,	1996),	104.	99	Ibid.,	105.	
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Andy Warhol, Liz # 6, 1963. 
lodges itself in between a kind of realism and abstraction—though it is not exactly either one.100 
Color comes to conjugate the two levels, bringing the literalness of the image and the abstraction 
of the field in which the image appears together on the surface of the screen. As the manual traits 
of the Modernist picture give way to the machinic repetitions of the screen, the image—deprived 
of its identity and its status as a worldspace—becomes an aggregate of information arranged on 
the screen and a vehicle for the intensive power of color. Color itself becomes an autonomous 
force set into variation on the continuum of the screen, which manipulates and captures a field of 
light—anticipating, in this way, holographic image capture.  
 Toward this end, the silkscreen propels painting into a new kind of image universe where 
the category of the “image” is complicated. Screen images are no longer reflective or 
representative of a phenomenal world, and they are no longer products of the eye and the hand. 																																																								100	Lawrence	Alloway:	“Pop	Art	is	neither	abstract	nor	realistic,	though	it	has	contacts	in	both	directions”	(Lawrence	Alloway,	“Popular	Culture	and	Pop-Art”	[1969],	in	Pop	Art:	A	
Critical	History	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1997),	169).	
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Steinberg and Deleuze identify this transformation as a shift from “nature” to “culture,” from 
eye-nature to the “brain-city,”101 where the influx of information and electronics “replaces 
nature,” as a new cerebrality “anterior to all motivity of bodies”102 comes to displace the “eyes of 
nature,”103 a type of vision synchronized with erect, bipedal locomotion. These images no longer 
belong to the confined space of the Modernist picture; the dialectics of inside and outside, visible 
and invisible, vertical and horizontal are eclipsed by the screen’s “omni-directional space” that 
perpetually exchanges vertical and horizontal and continuously varies its “angles and 
coordinates.”104 According to Steinberg, this internal change in painting and its images does not 
belong to it alone—its impetus and its consequence lie outside of art. The universe of the screen 
is not proper to art or to art history; it demands rethinking and reconceptualizing old means of 
analysis in order to invent new categories and new concepts that traverse older disciplinary 
fields. For Steinberg the world of advertising and mass communications provoked the concept of 
the flatbed. Now the universe of the screen and the paradigm of the digital incite “other criteria” 
to confront the disturbance of old forms. Like the flatbed itself, to conclude with Steinberg, the 
screen and the digital are “part of a shakeup which contaminates all purified categories. The 
deepening inroads of art into non-art continue to alienate the connoisseur [and the art historian] 
as art defects and departs into strange territories leaving the old stand-by criteria to rule an 
eroding plain.”105 
 																																																								101	Leo	Steinberg,	Other	Criteria:	Confrontations	with	Twentieth-Century	Art	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1972),	90.	102	Gilles	Deleuze,	Cinema	2:	The	Time-Image	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	1989),	267.	103	Ibid.,	265.	104	Ibid.	105	Leo	Steinberg,	Other	Criteria:	Confrontations	with	Twentieth-Century	Art	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1972),	91.	
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